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ABSTRACT 
 
Doping is defined by the World Anti-Doping Agency Code as the use of substances or methods capable of 
artificially increasing sports performance, whether they are potentially harmful to athletes health or to his 
opponents, or to the game spirit. The Olympic Sport deals daily with this competitor “off the beaten track” of 
the highest competence. This article was based on the reports on the anti-doping control situation in the 
Olympic Games in Brazil issued by the specialist of the US Congressional Research Service, the IAAF 
sanctioned positive athletics report, of the International Olympic Committee that dealt with the fight against 
doping and health promotion of athletes, the Independent Observer Reports of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
and the Anti-Doping Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. A special highlight was the doping cases 
orchestrated by the Russia Athletic Federation, as well as the efforts of institutions responsible for the fight 
against doping in the protection of clean athletes. The fight against doping in the Olympic Games in Brazil 
was classified as the worst anti-doping in the history of games, based on the volunteers organization and the 
effectiveness of the tests performed. The World Anti-Doping Agency indicated that less than half of the 
planned tests were conducted at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games. Key words: DOPING, ANTIDOPING, 
OLYMPIC GAMES, ATHLETES, RIO 2016.
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Rendimiento de Laboratorio: Dopaje en deportes 
olímpicos y Juegos de Rio 2016 
 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
El dopaje está definido por el Código de la Agencia Mundial Antidopaje, como el uso de sustancias o métodos 
capaces de aumentar artificialmente el rendimiento deportivo, ya sean potencialmente perjudiciales para la 
salud del atleta o de sus adversarios, o al espíritu del juego. Sin embargo, el Deporte Olímpico convive 
diariamente con este competidor "fuera de las pistas" de la más alta competencia. Este artículo se basó en 
los informes sobre la situación de control antidopaje en los Juegos Olímpicos en Brasil emitidos por 
especialistas de investigación del congreso norteamericano, de los informes de casos positivos en atletismo 
sancionados por la IAAF, del Comité Olímpico Internacional que versó sobre la lucha contra el dopaje y 
promoción de la salud de los atletas, de los informes de Observadores Independientes de la Agencia Mundial 
Antidoping y de la división antidoping del Tribunal de Arbitraje para el Deporte. Un destacado especial ha 
sido hecho para los casos de dopaje orquestados por la Federación Atlética Rússa, además de los esfuerzos 
de las instituciones responsables del combate al dopaje en la protección de los atletas limpios. El combate 
al dopaje en los Juegos Olímpicos de Brasil fue clasificado como el peor antidopaje de la historia de los 
juegos, con base en la organización de los voluntarios y la efectividad de las pruebas realizadas. La Agencia 
Mundial Antidoping indicó que menos de la mitad de las pruebas planificadas se realizaron en los Juegos 
Olímpicos Río 2016. Palabras clave: DOPAJE, ANTIDOPING, JUEGOS OLÍMPICOS, ATLETAS, RIO 2016. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important contentions that the Olympic Sports (OS) faces is not in the courts, fields, lanes 
or swimming pools, it is not part of the specific training of the coach, the incessant search for the best strategy 
for the best athletes, statistics for performance human, aero and hydrodynamic material goes much further, 
it occurs in doping design and manipulation laboratories. 
 
The doping world never sleeps or gives truce, chemists from all over the world continue to work with new 
substances to produce positive effects on athletes' performance and not to be detected in the doping controls. 
Lawyers specialized in doping cases are prepared to find the “gaps” in international and national legislations 
governing the matter and sports, along with that extends a whole network of traffic that try daily on any price 
to market their products. 
 
The reason is that there is a lot at stake, the difference between gold and silver, between a world record and 
a personal best, lies in a fraction of a second with a lot of cash involved. All sport superpowers understand 
this and invest countless amounts of money knowing they can not lose. These great powers always mention 
that they have the best scientific methods to discover the best athletes with the perfect innate characteristics, 
who have the best conditions of training, however it is known that along with this great structure are also the 
best doctors and the most powerful drugs, now with state incentive, now for individual commitment, doping 
is a present and striking figure in sports podiums and high performance sports shows. 
 
Table 1. Doping Statistics in the Olympic Games - 1968 to 2012. 
Year Place Number drugs tests Number of reported doping cases % of reported doping cases 
2012 London 5,051 9 0.18% 
2008 Beijing 4,770 25 0.52% 
2004 Athens 3,667 26 0.74% 
2000 Sydney 2,359 11 0.47% 
1996 Atlanta 1,923 2 0.10% 
1992 Barcelona 1,848 5 0.27% 
1988 Seoul 1,598 10 0.63% 
1984 Los Angeles 1,507 12 0.80% 
1980 Moscow 645 0 0.00% 
1976 Montreal 786 11 1.40% 
1972 Munich 2,079 7 0.34% 
1968 Mexico City 667 1 0.15% 
----- Total 26,900 119 0.44% 
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Table 2. Olympic Games doping cases by country, 1968-2010. 
Number of Reported 
Doping Cases 
Olympic Doping Cases by Country -1968-2010 
10 Austria 
9 Greece, Russia 
8 USA 
7 Bulgaria, Hungary 
5 Poland, Spain 
4 Germany, Sweden 
3 Great Britain, Mongolia, Norway, Ukraine 
2 Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Puerto Rico, 
Romania 
1 Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Bahrain, China, Croatia, Finland, Ireland, Iran, 
Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, 
North Korea, Slovakia, Turkey, Unified Team (CIS), USSR, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, West 
Germany 
127 Total 
Source: Report of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 2014. 
 
RIO 2016: SAFETY, ENVIRONMENT, AND PROBLEMS WITH DOPING 
 
In the report issued before the 2016 Olympic Games, by Halchin and Rollins, coordinatorsand specialists in 
the US Congressional Research Service, which we are now debating, is about the concerns that US leaders 
and athletes, and other nations with anti-doping control at the Rio 2016 Games. They asked whether the 
organizations in charge of protecting clean athletes would be up to the task in Brazil. What fueled this concern 
were the revelations that the Russian track and field team were involved in a doping scheme orchestrated by 
the Russian Athletics Federation. (Halchin & Rollins, 2016). 
 
The report also pointed out that the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was slow in responding when took 
notice of the claims orchestrated as early as 2010 pointed that there were “multiple warnings about doping 
generated by Russia” over the years and suggested that possible conflicts of interest could have played a 
role in WADA's slow response. 
 
Concerns that other Russian sports could also be contaminated by state-orchestrated doping were validated 
in July 2016 with the publication of the first part of a report by Richard McLaren to WADA (McLaren, 2016a) 
describing, among other things, how Russian sports organizations and authorities manipulated samples of 
Russian athletes in 2014, during the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. 
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Although the United States government is not directly involved in WADA or its anti-doping efforts, it provides 
support to the agency, especially when its interests are under threat. 
 
As signatories to the Copenhagen Declaration (WADA, 2003, 2015) on Anti-Doping in Sport, they support 
WADA and the World Anti-Doping Code (CODE)which includes financial support through membership dues 
(began payment in 2003 and by the year 2016, the US had transferred approximately $ 25 million).(Halchin 
& Rollins, 2016). 
 
With all this investment made and feeling threatened by the allegations involving Russia and WADA's anti-
doping role, the Senate Committee on Trade, Science, and Transportation, as well as the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee begin to act. On 20 June 2016, the chairman of the Senate commission noted that 
WADA had been informed in 2010 that the Russian athletes were involved in a doping scheme orchestrated 
by the government and that WADA's independence had been called into question. It was necessary to take 
sides in the matter. (Halchin & Rollins, 2016). 
 
Representatives of US Olympic athletes “invited” WADA to expand their research into other sports in Russia 
and other countries. The Energy and Commerce Committee of the House expressed similar concerns in a 
letter dated July 12, 2016 to the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), acknowledging the 
work that the IOC and WADA had done to increase efforts to ensure that athletes competed in sports free of 
doping. One of the challenges identified by the committee is that “neither WADA nor IOC are functionally 
organized to achieve the goal of eradicating doping in sport.” This concern extends until the Rio 2016 Olympic 
Games. (Halchin & Rollins, 2016). 
 
THE RUSSIAN ATHLETICS FEDERATION AND DOPING BUY TICKETS FOR RIO 2016 
 
The Guardian Journal, on December 3, 2014, a documentary screened on German television claiming “the 
existence of a sophisticated and well-established doping system sponsored by the Russian state with its 
athletic federation.” (Oltermann, P. 2014). 
 
As a result, WADA formed an Independent Commission (IC) for the investigation, which began in January 
2015, concluded with the publication of two reports, the first focusing on allegations of the German TV 
documentary.The conclusions sended in November 2015 report were (McLaren, 2016a): 
 
1. There is a deep-rooted “culture of deception”, which means the acceptance of fraud at all 
levels is widespread and longstanding. 
2. The exploitation of athletes is acceptable, resulting in unethical behavior and practices, 
becoming the norm. 
3. Many Russian athletes have participated in the consistent and systematic use of 
performance-enhancing drugs. 
4. Physicians, trainers and laboratory personnel have been involved in systematic fraud. 
 
The report also included two warnings: although there were reliable indications that other sports in Russia 
had doping problems, the IC stated that these sports were outside the scope of what had been directed at 
the investigation. The commission also stated that “Russia is not the only country, nor athletics the only sport, 
facing the problem of doping orchestrated in sport.” The delivery of the report in November 2015 was 
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immediately followed by responses from the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), and 
WADA. The IAAF provisionally suspended the Russian Athletic Federation (ARAF) as a member of the IAAF 
with immediate effect. (IAAF, 2015). 
 
A significant consequence of this suspension was the prohibition of athletes and support staff of the Russian 
Federation from competing in international competitions, including Rio 2016 Olympic Games. WADA's 
response was to provisionally suspend the Moscow Anti-Doping Center and recommend that the center's 
head, Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov, was removed permanently (he immediately resigned). Shortly after, it 
assessed the compliance of the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA) with the World Anti-Doping Code. 
In a press release, WADA announced that RUSADA was not in compliance with the Code. (CAS, 2016). 
 
The IAAF Council met to consider whether ARAF had fulfilled the conditions for reintegration. The report of 
the IAAF Working Group to the Council stated that several verification criteria had not been met and included 
several recommendations, all of which were accepted by the IAAF Board. In line with the recommendations, 
the IAAF decided that ARAF should not be reinstated, a decision that was endorsed by both the IOC and 
WADA, and that no other ARAF staff (such as staff and athlete support staff) could participate in competitions 
of the IAAF while ARAF was suspended. (IAAF, 2016). 
 
At the same time the Russian Olympic Committee and individual athletes from Russia individually submitted 
arbitration requests to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on IAAF decisions. The CAS arbitration panel 
decided in favor of the IAAF, thus confirming the ban on Russian athletics athletes. (CAS ad hoc Division OG 
Rio 013, 2016). 
 
Following the release of the IC Report on July 24, 2016, the IOC issued a protocol requiring some conditions 
that Russian athletes must meet to be eligible to compete in Rio 2016. The main one was the athlete's anti-
doping record, which should “only reliable international tests”. In addition, International Federations (IF), 
which were responsible for deciding which athletes were eligible to participate in the Olympic Games, were 
advised by the IOC that the absence of positive doping results would not be considered sufficient to establish 
that an athlete does not use it. (IOC, 2014a). 
 
The IOC would accept Russian athletes for participation in the Rio Games only if the IF was convinced that 
the evidence provided met the IOC conditions and IF determination was confirmed by a specialist on the list 
of CAS officials. Russian athletes who were previously sanctioned for doping, or who were unable to meet 
IOC criteria, would not be allowed to compete at the Rio 2016 Games. (IOC, 2014a). 
 
The consequences for the Russian Olympic Committee were the 30% drop in the size of its team that was 
eligible for the Rio 2016 Games. As announced by the IOC on 4 August 2016, the Russian Olympic Team 
(ROC) with 271 athletes; the original entry list for the included 389 athletes. However, the number of Russian 
athletes could still change. On August 8, 2016, CBS News reported that seven Russian swimmers who had 
been banned from participating in the Rio 2016 Games were allowed to compete, although the International 
Swimming Federation (FINA) did not fully explain why, one of the Russian swimmers participated in the 
semifinal of the 100 meters shallow on August 7, 2016. (CBS, 2016). 
 
The conflict of interests of the IFs, with the IOC and WADA, allowed this ethical misalignment in dealing with 
the OS. Athletes, coaches and sports leaders when they are sanctioned resort to the organs that, even 
without the specific competence in the matter, find themselves in a position to generate an official opinion, 
by the power they have with the IOC, discrediting the institutions that control doping in the OS. 
Nascimento et al. / Doping in Olympic sports and Rio 2016 Games                                 JOURNAL OF HUMAN SPORT & EXERCISE 
                     VOLUME 13 | Proc1 | 2018 |   S105 
 
On June 21, 2016, the IOC convened an Olympic Summit, aiming guaranteeing “equal conditions for all 
participating athletes” at the Rio 2016 Games, recommended that the IFs and the National Olympic 
Committees (NOC) take all necessary measures to prevent “doped athletes” from participating in the Rio 
2016 Games, and to refrain from requesting accreditation for the matches for “anyone currently involved in 
an anti-doping rule violation.” (IOC, 2016a). 
 
The Olympic Sport also stated that Russian and Kenyan1 athletes are not entitled to “presumption of 
innocence” because neither country complies with the CODE and there were “substantial allegations” about 
the sports organizations of those countries. 
 
In the spring of the northern hemisphere 2016, the IOC decided to re-test samples from the 2008 Beijing and 
London 2012 Games. Two of the planned four rounds of re-tests occurred. (IOC, 2016b). With focus on the 
athletes who could participate in the Rio 2016 Games, 454 samples obtained during the 2008 Beijing Games 
were tested again in the first round. The results indicated that 31 athletes from 6 sports and 12 countries had 
a positive result. The second round involved re-testing 386 samples and resulted in 30 positive results, of 
which 23 were from athletes who received a medal during the Beijing Olympics, these positive results was 
from 4 sports and 8 countries. (IOC, 2016b). 
 
On May 27, 2016, the IOC announced that in the first round of re-tests, analysis of 265 samples of the 2012 
London Games resulted positive for 23 athletes from 5 sports and 6 countries. The second round resulted in 
15 positive tests from a set of 138 samples involving 2 sports and 9 countries. The re-examination of 1,243 
samples of the Beijing and London Games in rounds one and two resulted in 98 positive tests. (IOC, 2016b). 
 
The implications of this situation, including the IC Report, go beyond the consequences for Russian sports 
organizations, athletes and officials. Other athletes (in particular, non-Russian athletes) are interested in the 
results of research and related subjects. Following the release of the IC report in November 2015 and prior 
to the June 2016 IAAF decision to maintain the ARAF suspension, several organizations representing the 
interests of Olympic athletes shared their concerns with the IOC and WADA leaders. 
 
Generally, representatives of athlete organizations, in separate communications, expressed dissatisfaction 
with the actions of WADA or the IOC and advocated that both organizations do more to protect clean athletes 
and to protect sports in all countries. A common theme was the call for expanded research on other countries 
and other Russian sports. As the chairman of the WADA Athletes' Committee said in a speech, the IC report 
noted the “total and absolute untruth” of the orchestrated doping system in Russia serving only athletic 
athletes. (WADA, 2016a). 
 
One month before the IAAF decision on ARAF, the presidents of the IOC Athletes Commission and the 
WADA Athletes' Committee expressed in a letter to the IOC and WADA presidents the prospect of their 
“shared constituency:” in these times, the athlete's confidence in the anti-doping system, the WADA and the 
IOC was broken. Although the IAAF decision to suspend ARAF banning Russian athletes from competing in 
the Rio 2016 Games was welcomed by the IOC Athletes Commission and the WADA Athletes Committee, 
the athletes did not reactwell, soon after IOC's decision not to impose a total ban on Russian athletes. 
 
                                                 
1 WADA stated on May 12, 2016, that the Kenya Anti-Doping Agency is not in compliance with the Code. Also in 2016, a news 
article reported that the chairman of the Kenya Athletics Association has requested bribes from two Kenyan athletes in exchange 
for reducing their doping suspensions. HALCHIN, L.E; ROLLINS, J.W. (2016). 
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PROTECTING CLEAN ATHLETES 
 
The IC Report emphasizes the need to strengthen efforts to protect clean athletes, which was initiated by the 
IOC at the end of December 2014. Following the IOC's 127th Session, held on December 9, 2014, the IOC 
changed its philosophy of doping and called for greater independence of WADA. (IOC, 2014b). 
 
On August 2, 2015, the new Olympic Charter states that the IOC's role is: “to protect clean athletes and the 
integrity of sport by leading the fight against doping.” Previously, the Charter stated that the IOC's role in 
doping was:“to lead the fight against doping in sport”.Explaining his change of philosophy, the IOC wrote, 
that: “the Olympic Movement is all about clean athletes, they are our best ambassadors, models, and our 
treasure. So, we have, above all, to protect clean athletes, against doping, manipulation and corruption, we 
have to change our way of thinking, we must consider every penny in fighting these evils not as an expense 
but as an investment in the future of the OS, we must realize that the capture of fraud is extremely important, 
but only a means to an end: the protection of clean athletes”. (IOC, 2015a). 
 
Since the change of the Olympic Charter, the IOC has taken measures to improve the protection of clean 
athletes. At the Olympic Summit in October 2015 the IOC proposed that athletes' tests be independent of 
sports organizations and requested that WADA lead a task force to study the proposal for WADA itself to 
take responsibility for the test. (IOC, 2015a). 
 
In December 2015, the IOC Executive Board unanimously adopted a statement which included proposals for 
WADA and CAS. The executive board proposed that WADA establish an independent entity for testing and 
management of results, that the new entity should include a unit dedicated to collecting information and that 
“sports organizations should transfer their doping control operations to this new organization.” (IOC, 2015b). 
 
The proposal of the IOC Executive Board involving CAS indicated that the court should be the agency that 
proclaims doping sanctions. This change, according to the board, would centralize the sanctions system and 
be cost-effective, creating a more harmonized anti-doping system across all sports and all countries. (IOC, 
2015b). Finally, the IOC invited WADA to convene a “World Conference on Doping” in 2017, but before that 
had a great test: the XXXI Summer Olympics - Rio 2016. 
 
Table 3 - Disqualified Athletes of the Rio 2016 Olympic Games.  
Athlete Country Sport Prohibited 
Substance 
Medal Test details 
Izzat Artykov Kyrgyzstan Weightlifting 
69 kg 
Strychnine Bronze 
(69 kg) 
Positive test for strychnine and 
loss of medalannounced by 
CAS. 
Chen Xinyi China Swimming 
100 meters 
butterfly 
Hydrochlorothiazide 
 
Tested positive for the diuretic 
hydrochlorothiazide applied for 
sample B to be tested and the 
hearing to be performed. 
Anastassya 
Kudinova 
Kazakhstan Athletics 
400 meters 
Drostanolone 
 
Proof out of competition in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, on July 13, 
2016 
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Kléber 
Ramos 
Brazil Cycling road EPO CERA 
 
Pre-competition test July 31 and 
out of competition test (blood 
and urine) August 4. 
Temporarily suspended by the 
UCI on 12 August. 
Serghei 
Tarnovschi 
Moldavia Canoeing 
C-1 1000 m 
C-2 1000 m 
GHRP-2 Bronze 
(C-1 
1000 
m) 
Pre-competition test result. 
Temporarily suspended on 
August 18. 
Chagnaadorj 
Usukhbayar 
Mongolia Weightlifting 
 56 kg 
Exogenous 
testosterone 
 
IOC out of competition on 
August 7.  
Source: IAAF, 2016; CAS, 2016; UCI, 2016. 
 
Table 4 - Athletes who were selected for the Games but were suspended before the games start. 
Name Country Sport Prohibited 
Substance 
Test details 
Silvia 
Danekova 
Bulgaria Athletics EPO  Provisionally suspended after a failed test of 
sample A, given a few days after arrival in Brazil. 
Theodora 
Gianeni 
Greece Swimming 
50 meters 
freestyle 
Not disclosed Sent home on the day of the opening ceremony of 
the games after failing a pre-game test held on 
July 25. 
Antonis 
Martasidis 
Cyprus Weightlifting  
85 kg 
Not disclosed Sent home on the day of the opening ceremony of 
the games after failing a pre-game test held on 
July 25. 
Michael 
O'Reilly 
Ireland Boxing 
average 
weight 
Not disclosed He admitted taking a diuretic supplement given to 
him by someone else. 
Narsingh 
Pancham 
Yadav 
India Wrestling 74 
kg 
Metandienona Originally cleaned to compete by the National 
Anti-Doping Agency of India after positive tests on 
June 25 and July 5. WADA's appeal was upheld 
by CAS on Aug. 18, with a four-year suspension. 
Adrian 
Zieliński 
Poland Weightlifting 
94 kg 
Nandrolone Waiting for sentence 
Tomasz 
Zieliński 
Poland Weightlifting  
 94 kg 
Nandrolone Sent home early in the Olympics after testing 
positive at the Polish Championships in July. 
Source: IAAF, 2016; CAS, 2016; UCI, 2016. 
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OLYMPIC GAMES RIO 2016: THE WORST ANTIDOPING IN HISTORY 
 
Anti-doping control at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games was marked as the “worst” of all Games. After the sample 
collection process was compromised by a wave of non-appearances of athletes, lack of training and numbers 
of volunteers and testers, and a series of safety lapses. 
 
Telegraph Sport correspondent Ben Rumsby, said efforts to keep the first Olympics Gamesafter Russian 
doping scandal were in danger of being destroyed by the Games' organizational chaos in Brazil. The integrity 
of the entire process was under threat due to the severe shortage of staff, with only half of the volunteers 
recruited to help carry out the official doping control protocols developed. The organizers also admitted that 
unauthorized persons had access to restricted areas during the drug testing process, although they denied 
that they had failed to ensure anti-doping at the Games was irreproachable. (Rumsby, B. 2016). 
 
Rio 2016 Games began less than three weeks after the publication of a condemnatory report in which Russia 
was found guilty of state-sponsored doping at the 2014 Winter Olympics. An investigation by McLaren also 
has discovered a sample exchange plan orchestrated by the Kremlin at the Sochi anti-doping laboratory. 
(McLaren, 2016a, 2016b). 
 
In this sense, the Rio Games was the opportunity to restore the credibility of the drug test process, but it 
appears that this has not happened, only officials “full of resources” in doping control from countries such as 
the UK have prevented integrity collection was compromised. 
 
Another alarming finding was that a large number of volunteers had picked up their uniforms at the start of 
the Games to never go back, and others came in every day just to enjoy “free meals.” Some doping control 
officials described “throwing in the towel “and returned home in the midst of claims they made, for having to 
pay for taxis from their own pockets to get to the sites to collect samples in time. 
 
Rumbsey (2016), also reported that Rio 2016 communications director Mario Andrada said he was unaware 
of any problems caused by the shortage of personnel but admitted that volunteers allowed safety breaches 
to occur during doping control in certain locations: 
 
“At the start of the Games, people complained about the lack of volunteer training”, he said. “Not all 
the halls leading to the doping areas were cleaned, the volunteers were not strong enough and some 
people were very close to areas that should be restricted. We've fixed that problem.” 
The Rio 2016 Organizing Committee has admitted that of its 70,000 planned volunteers have been reduced 
to a staff of 56,000 due to budget cuts. And of these only about 70% actually worked. Unpaid workers are 
vital to the successful operation of the sample collection process at an important event such as the Olympic 
Games, in which about 5,000 drug tests will be held. Volunteers are often employed as accompanying 
athletes to doping control to ensure that the tests are not avoided or circumvented in any other way. (Rumsby, 
B. 2016). 
 
Michele Verroken, the UK's former anti-doping chief, told Telegraph Sport: “It is extremely disappointing that 
anything that happened earlier continues to occur at the Olympic Games. We came to the situation where 
we were lucky to catch anyone.” (Rumsby, B. 2016). 
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The same reporting highlights Kenya, which not only appeared on the podium, but in another scandal related 
to the drug test process was evidenced in Rio 2016, when Kenyan athletic trainer John Anzrah was caught 
taking Ferguson Cheruiyot Rotich's credential when the 800 meters runner was being searched to provide a 
sample. Anzrah was sent home but denied passing by Rotich in order to test him, insisting that he borrowed 
the credential to get a free meal. (Rumsby, B. 2016). 
 
Brazil stopped conducting drug tests on its top athletes one month before the Games after its anti-doping 
laboratory had its accreditation suspended. This suspension was lifted in time for the Olympics and during 
the first week of the games the laboratory had processed 3,743 samples. 
 
Andrada insisted that there was no flaw in the process before the athletes' urine and blood arrived in the lab 
“there was no impairment in any way or outside of the test procedures, we have zero tolerance for doping,” 
he added. “The Doping operation is working as it should be and the risk is zero of an endemic problem or 
system problem occurs, drug testing in the Games is being monitored by an independent observer group 
named by World Anti-Doping Agency.” (Rumsby, B. 2016). 
 
“WADA is not involved in the process of doping control in the Games, except through an independent 
observation mission that will publish its report after the Games. The process of doping control in the Games 
is under the responsibility of the IOC, working in collaboration with the organizing committee. It is not WADA's 
role to comment on doping control issues in the Games until the IC Report is published.” (Rumsby, B 2016). 
 
AFTER THE RIO 2016 GAMES WADA REVEALS THAT UP TO 50% OF THE DRUG TESTS HAD TO BE 
ABORTED 
 
The WADA report on the anti-doping operation employed at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games indicated “serious 
failures.” Up to half of all planned drug tests were aborted because athletes could not be found. The 55-page 
report from WADA's IC accused the Rio 2016 anti-doping department's management team of “lack of 
coordination,” which has contributed to the almost uncontrollable strain of drug testing at competition places 
and Athletes' Village. (WADA, 2016b). 
 
In addition to a “lack of coordination and unified approach” between Rio 2016 anti-doping department 
management, the report also blamed failures on “budget and operational cuts”, which meant fewer resources 
for the fight against doping.Tensions between the Rio 2016department management and the Brazilian Anti-
Doping Agency, with the significant personnel changes in the anti-doping department of Rio 2016 a year 
before the Games, contributed to an amateur approach to the problem. 
 
The report was incisively critical of the lack of support, training and information given to test attendants whose 
job it was to notify athletes of anti-doping controls. “Attendants were provided little or no whereabouts 
information for test athletes who were out of competition in the Athletes' Village, most of the time they had to 
turn to the delegations and / or athletes of the same delegation they were looking for”, says the report. 
(WADA, 2016b). 
 
In addition, when initial attempts to find an athlete in their room were unsuccessful, attendants often lacked 
the training and / or confidence to follow up with more questions and effort to find the athlete elsewhere in 
the Village. Ultimately, many test athletes simply could not be found and the mission had to be aborted. In 
some days up to 50% of planned target tests were aborted. 
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The report also pointed to the lack of support for the companions, for example: those who went out looking 
for athletes and spent much time on the mission, when they returned they no longer found food, this led many 
to not collaborate properly. (WADA, 2016b). 
 
About transportation facilities to allow doping control agents to travel their meeting places were “often 
inadequate, or even non-existent.” Observers said that computers and printers that needed to receive and 
print “mission orders” sometimes did not work, even when computers were running, not enough accounts 
and login were given to doping control personnel. (WADA, 2016b). 
 
No out-of-competition test was conducted in football. According to the same report, little or no competition 
testing has been done on many sports and high-risk tests such as weightlifting. The Independent Observers 
found this “surprising”. Nearly 500 fewer drug tests than planned were conducted in Rio 2016, according to 
the report. The plan was to do 5,380 tests in total, but in reality, only 4,882 were performed. And of the 450 
blood tests on the athlete's biological passport, only 47 were performed. (WADA, 2016b). 
 
The number of athletes tested in the total in the Games was 3,237, 28.62% of the number of participants. In 
the end the report goes on to praise the individual effort undertaken by the volunteers who actually embraced 
the task. Affirming that, had it not been for its personal “on-the-ground” staff, the Games' anti-doping program 
almost certainly collapsed due to its initiative, tenacity and professionalism in the face of great difficulties, the 
numerous problems identified were corrected and the collection of samples was conducted to ensure the 
identity and integrity of the samples, the report says. (WADA, 2016b). 
 
Particular praise was also paid to the managers of the anti-doping control stations who, even though they did 
not receive on-site training on the role to play, did not have site-specific information and did not have specific 
guidelines for each sport, often arrived at the site for the first time already on the first day of testing, where 
they were presented with an insufficient number of companions to carry out the planned tests in the best 
possible way. 
 
Despite its condemnatory criticism, the WADA report also commended the Brazilian Doping Control 
Laboratory, which had been suspended before the start of the Games for failing to meet international 
standards. The report confirmed that the laboratory was well equipped, operated very safely and efficiently, 
and now represents an exceptional legacy of the Games for the anti-doping movement in South America. 
 
BACK TO RUSSIA: THE MEETING OF LIMA 2017 
 
The first group of Russian athletes suspected of benefiting from the efficient doping state program for the 
2014 Sochi Winter Games may now, with the approach the 2018 PyeongChang Games in South Korea, face 
sanctions, including the prospect of expulsion for these games. 
 
Denis Oswald, a Swiss member of the IOC Executive Council who led one of two investigations into the 
Russian doping program, told committee members at the annual meeting of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) executives held in Lima, Peru, from 13 to 17 October, September 2017, which hopes that 
the investigation will be completed by the end of the year and that the athletes involved will be penalized. He 
also pointed out the perspective of these athletes who were medalists in Sochi having to return the medals 
and be banned. “We feel we have found several elements to sanction a good number of athletes," Oswald 
said. (Panja, T. 2017). 
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At the Sochi Games, Russia was suspected of tampering with urine samples from athletes who tested positive 
for anti-doping. The leader of the investigation stated that the delay in testing Sochi samples stemmed from 
a difficulty in finding a suitable method to detect whether the special urine collection vessel, which were 
considered by the tamper-proof protocol, had been tampered with. "In a few days we will have the results of 
the first 50 samples, and then we can proceed." (Panja, T. 2017). 
 
Today this possible sanction of Russian athletes can "cool" the Olympic Flame as it did in the Rio 2016 
Games, when news of the doping scheme emerged and prompted a number of sports federations to prevent 
Russian athletes from attending the Games. 
 
The competence of the Russian doping scheme was revealed last year when World Anti-Doping Agency 
researcher Richard McLaren reported before the start of the Rio 2016 Games how the state machine worked 
in the production of its athletes. His report used forensic analysis to corroborate the testimony of the former 
head of Russia's national anti-doping laboratory, Grigory Rodchenkov, who described how he and Russia's 
intelligence helped national Olympic athletes to use banned substances that improve performance at the 
Sochi Games. (McLaren, 2016b). 
 
The report, produced by McLaren, sought to break through the borders of Russian doping schemes beyond 
the Sochi games and identified about 1,000 athletes involved. At the moment, a number of interests are 
represented by companies, brands, sponsors and countries that can not fail to profit from the "Olympic 
business". AND... 
 
The report also suggested that proving the involvement of agencies and athletes involved will likely be 
difficult. The World Anti-Doping Agency has released 95 of the first 96 athletes whose doping cases in 
competitions have been reviewed and it was not possible to prove the positive re-test. It was also reported 
that the amount of evidence in the athletes varied widely, so the sports authorities were instrumental in 
seeking additional evidence to reinforce the lawsuits unchained. 
 
This raised a debate in the sporting world about whether Russia's schemes succeeded in destroying evidence 
since the cases investigated so far could not attest and punish the first 96 athletes investigated. "The available 
evidence was insufficient to support the allegation of anti-doping rule violation against these 95 athletes," 
agency director general Olivier Niggli wrote in the internal report obtained by The New York Times. The report 
does not identify any of the 96 athletes. (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
In an interview Niggli said: "The system was very well organized," referring to the trickery co-ordinated by 
Russia. "Achieving evidence of the doping scheme years after that has generated the problem that the 
evidence obtained is limited." (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
Richard McLaren also reported that the cases would be difficult to track because of Russia's failure to provide 
data and the "practice of destroying samples" since it proved positive in the re-tests, that would be to attest 
to the veracity of the scheme. (McLaren, 2016b). 
 
Other data are important to report: the sports authorities charged with lawsuits against the 95 freed athletes 
appear not to have followed the clues. No one asked for interviews with Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov who was 
head of RUSADA's laboratory and fled Russia after denouncing the operation of the state machine in the 
doping program, whose testimony resulted in the report of the McLaren investigation, which showed his 
professional action in the production of super athletes and the destruction of evidence. (Ruiz, 2017). 
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Jim Walden, attorney for Dr. Rodchenkov questioned in defense the fact that the sports authorities did not 
request the testimony of his client and claimed that he was not available, that today he lives hidden in the 
United States under protection of the Department of Justice and under warrant of Russia, "The alleged 
unavailability of Dr. Rodchenkov was cited as one of the reasons for the closure of investigations of athletes," 
the lawyer further stated that his client was willing to cooperate, "only an Olympic investigator request an 
interview." (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
Once the McLaren report described Russia's doping program, the sanctioning of athletes fell into the global 
sports bureaucracy. IFs were imbued with examining their own athletes and punishing when justified. WADA 
would review decisions taken by IFs and determine whether to approve or respond. This process has 
generated the 95 cases the agency has agreed to file. (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
Some authorities have expressed concern about conflicts of interest among IF leaders because they may be 
inclined not to punish their athletes. WADA chief, Craig Reedie, who is also a member of the IOC, was asked 
about his dual role as promoter of the Olympic brand and at the same time have to seek evidence that could 
overshadow it. IFs and the IOC have maximum authority over sanctioning athletes, but the declarations of 
the anti-doping regulator are influential, and the agency has the power to appeal cases. (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
In defense Niggli emphasized that investigations into other athletes involved in the doping system continue, 
and that authorities needed to follow the strongest evidence, to bring them to the world's sporting arbitration 
court. "Bringing a weak or poorly prepared case to court could adversely affect the outcome of all others," he 
said. (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
To that end, the IOC opened disciplinary proceedings against Russian athletes, along with the anti-doping 
regulator, which had indicated Russia's non-participation in the Rio 2016 Olympic Games, published 1,166 
evidences of Russia's schemes. While the evidences including e-mails, documents, forensic and scientific 
analyzes effectively proves a doping system, Niggli said the evidence does not necessarily translate into the 
judgment of the athletes McLaren identified as benefiting from the program. (McLaren, 2016b). 
 
Of the 96 cases evaluated, only one athlete was successfully sanctioned because the authorities recovered 
an incriminating urine sample from Dr. Rodchenkov's former laboratory, in response the Russian government 
prevented entry into a specific area of the laboratory that contained other samples. 
 
At the Rio 2016 Games, doubts about which athletes would participate continued until the day before the 
event. This whole problem was aggravated by the fact that the president of the IOC favored individual 
judgment at the expense of collective responsibility and consequently diminished the impact of the Russian 
state scheme. He commented that the decision on Russia's participation in Rio 2016 would respect the 
statements made by the IFs separately. Some federations, such as cycling, rowing and athletics, have 
adopted unrestricted bans, while others allowed for the participation of athletes who could prove they were 
clean. (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
None of the Winter Sports IFs supported a total ban on Russian athletes at the 2018 Pyeongchang Games, 
showing the strength of Russia at the Winter Games as well. The non-participation of the Russian Federation 
would obfuscate the "brilliance" of games even with athletes under the shadow of doping. This position seems 
to have been shared by the majority of IOC members at the meeting of the Executive Committee in Lima. 
"For me, the important thing is that innocent athletes should be there," said Tunku Imran, a member of the 
IOC representing Malaysia. (Ruiz, 2017). 
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After the meeting of the IOC Executive Committee in Lima, what transpired was that any possible penalty 
against Russia will have to wait until the conclusion of a more comprehensive report on the scheme, which 
is being developed by the team of former President Samuel Schmid of Switzerland, current chair of the IOC 
Disciplinary Commission (DC). In his communication to the Committee on the McLaren report, he stated: 
 
1. As chair of the IOC DC, it is a great honor to have the opportunity to present my interim 
report to the Session. At this stage, as the investigation is not finalized and as all information 
is very sensitive, DC welcomes your understanding that, at this time, no detailed information 
can be disclosed. However, the DC can keep the session informed about the current state 
of the work done so far and the next steps. 
2. Since the last session of the IOC in Rio de Janeiro, DC has initiated a large number of 
hearings and exchanges of written information with several persons capable of providing 
appropriate information about the facts as well as about the general sports system in Russia. 
For reasons of confidentiality, the list of such persons may not be disclosed. 
3. At the same time, the DC made a detailed and in-depth analysis of the WADA IC Reports, 
the IP Reports and all the evidence (EDP - published by IP as an appendix to the second 
report published on December 9, 2016). This analysis was consolidated after the publication 
in May 2017 of EDP commissioned by WADA. These documents cover the period from 
August 2012 to August 2015, except in February 2014. 
4. The Prof. Richard McLaren helped with this DC, explaining the various EDPs and the content 
of the confidential elements provided by various witnesses collected by IP. The content and 
truthfulness of confidential witnesses are currently being evaluated in the light of the 
objective and impartial elements available to the DC. 
5. The methodology of forensic examination of marks and scratches on urine sample 
containers has been finalized and validated at the Forensic Department (ESC) of the 
University of Lausanne (UNIL) and samples of the Sochi Olympic Games are being 
analyzed. The results will be communicated to the two DCs during the autumn of 2017. 
6. The outcome of this forensic examination is one of the key elements for the evaluation of 
witnesses on the specific period of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi; therefore, the DC 
schedule depends on these results. 
7. Once the remaining hearings and the latest evaluations have been held, the DC will inform 
the IOC Executive Board. It is difficult at this stage to define a detailed timeline; however, 
the Executive Board requested that the report be finalized before the 2018 Winter Olympics 
in PyeongChang. (Lima, September 15, 2017). (IOC, 2017). 
Russia does not seem to mind the outcome of the investigations and remains confident in bringing a full 
contingent of athletes to Pyeongchang. "It will be a Russian team with the Russian anthem and the Russian 
flag," Alexander Zhukov, head of the Russian Olympic Committee, said in an interview. He also denied that 
there was a state-backed conspiracy to dope athletes, and says he supports the investigations as there is a 
rehabilitation plan established by the WADA. (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
In contrast, Reedie suggested that probably some penalty will come soon "Alexander is well aware of this," 
said moments after Zhukov again deny the existence of a national plot to deceive the president of WADA. 
The Russian case has created tensions within the clean sports movement. A group of 17 anti-doping 
agencies issued a letter demanding that Russia be excluded from Pyeongchang 2018. "The lack of rapid 
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research on the Russian doping scheme poses a clear and present danger to clean athletes worldwide and 
at the Winter Games of 2018, "said the letter, whose signatories include the anti-doping agencies of the 
United States and England. (Ruiz, 2017). 
 
AT THE CONCLUSION 
 
Doping reflects the extraordinary dimension of those who make high-performance sports. Looking for 
alternatives from the ethical point of view to control the search at the maximum performance should be the 
way to go. The state of physical, social and psychic well-being is affected by this search. The role of every 
professional who works with a view to high performance is not only to create the material conditions 
necessary to increase sports performance, but also with this same ethics to avoid future losses, because the 
constant search of the limits of the body always supposes the risk. 
 
What other workers dope to achieve higher incomes at work? At the top of the list is the high-performance 
sport. They forgot that sport was / is a civilizing effort, and as a thread of hope we pointed out that the 
sportsman is not only the one who strengthened his muscles and developed resistance through sports 
practice, but also one who by this same practice learned to repress his anger, to be tolerant of his 
companions, not to take advantage of a vile advantage, to feel intimately as a disgrace the slightest suspicion 
of a cheating and to bear with a head high and with joy, not only the victory, but also the disappointment of 
the defeat that is represented here by doping. 
 
REFERÊNCIAS 
 
AS (2016). Media Release. Court of Arbitration for Sport. Lausanne, Switzerland. Retrieved from: 
http://www.tas-cas.org 
CAS ad hoc Division OG 16/013. (2016). Court of Arbitration for Sport. CAS ad hoc Division OG Rio 
16/013 Anastasia Karabelshikova & Ivan Podshivalov v. FISA & IOC. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
CBS Interactive Inc. (2016). 7 Russian swimmers barred from competing in the Rio Olympics. Retrieved 
from: https://www.cbsnews.com 
IAAF. (2015). Council of the International Association of Athletics Federations. Retrieved from: 
https://www.iaaf.org 
IAAF. (2016). Council of the International Association of Athletics Federations. Retrieved from: 
https://www.iaaf.org 
International Olympic Committee, IOC. (2014a). The fight against doping and promotion of athletes 
health. Lausanne, Switzerland. 
International Olympic Committee, IOC (2014b). IOC Annual Report 2014: credibility, sustainability and 
youth. Lausanne, Switzerland. 
International Olympic Committee, IOC (2015a). Olympic charter. Lausanne, Switzerland. 
International Olympic Committee, IOC (2015b). IOC executive board meetings in Lausanne, 8 to 10 
december. Retrieved from: https://www.olympic.org 
International Olympic Committee, IOC (2016a). Declaration of the Olympic summit. Retrieved from: 
https://www.olympic.org 
International Olympic Committee, IOC (2016b). The IOC takes decisive action to protect the clean 
athletes - doped athletes from Beijing, London and Sochi all targeted. Retrieved from: 
https://www.olympic.org 
International Olympic Committee, IOC (2017). Current status of work of the Samuel Schmid disciciplinary 
commission relating to the McLaren report. Retrieved from: https://stillmed.olympic.org 
Nascimento et al. / Doping in Olympic sports and Rio 2016 Games                                 JOURNAL OF HUMAN SPORT & EXERCISE 
                     VOLUME 13 | Proc1 | 2018 |   S115 
 
McLaren, R. (2016a). The independent commission report-Part I. Quebec, Canada. 
McLaren, R. (2016b). The independent commission report-Part II. Quebec, Canada. 
Oltermann, P. (2014). Russia accused of athletics doping cover-up on German TV. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com 
Panja, T. (2017, September 16). I.O.C. Investigation of Russian Doping Could Lead to Sanctioning of 
Athletes. The New York Times. p. D6. 
Ruiz, R. R. (2017, September 13). World Anti-Doping Agency Clears 95 Russian Athletes. The New York 
Times. p. B9. 
Rumsby, B. (2016). Rio 2016 Olympics: Anti-doping branded 'worst’ in Games history. The Telegraph. 
Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
WADA, World Anti-Doping Code (2003). The revised 2015 World Anti-Doping Code is effective as of 1 
January 2015. Quebec, Canada. 
WADA (2016a). WADA Athlete Committee Statement: Independent Investigation confirms Russian State 
manipulation of the doping control process [website]. Retrieved from: https://www.wada-ama.org 
WADA (2016b). Report of the Independent Observers Games of the XXXI Olympiad, Rio de Janeiro 
2016. Montreal, Canada. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This title is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. 
